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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFINITION CLAUSE IN THE CANAL POLICY OF 
INSURANCE IS NOT AMBIGUOUS 
Regal alleges that the relevant insuring and/or definition clauses of the Canal 
policy are "ambiguous." Regal's conclusory claim that the policy provisions are 
"ambiguous" is without basis. The "ambiguity" argument was not made at the trial 
court level. Canal respectfully submits that this Court can review the relevant Personal 
Injury Protection ("PIP") sections of the Canal policy and make a determination based 
on the policy language and Utah law whether or not PIP coverage applies to the KC 
Trucking semi-trailer under the circumstances of the accident. Canal issued a policy of 
insurance to KC Trucking. The KC Trucking semi-trailer was borrowed by Donald 
Boyet ("Boyet") and was being pulled by and was attached to a semi-tractor owned by 
Boyet and operated by Kelly J. Devey ("Devey"). This semi-tractor trailer unit 
collided with Christina Chatwin, a pedestrian. 
The plain language of the policy defines "eligible injured person," includes: 
A pedestrian if the accident involves the use of an insured 
motor vehicle. (Emphasis added). 
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The plain language of the definition of "insured motor vehicle," is defined as a 
motor vehicle with respect to which: 
(a) The bodily injury liability insurance of the policy 
applies and for which a specific premium is charged and 
(b) The named insured is required to maintain security 
under the provisions of Title 31A Utah Code Annotated . . . 
(Emphasis added). 
The language contained in § 31A-22-302(2) specifically exempts semi-trailers 
from the security requirements of § 41-12a-301. When the KC Trucking trailer is 
attached to the tractor insured by another company, it becomes part of that "motor 
vehicle" and the tractors insurers have responsibility for the entire vehicle. (Utah Code 
Annotated § 41-12a-103(4)). When the KC Trucking trailer is not attached to the KC 
Trucking tractor, the trailer, in and of itself, is not covered under the PIP provision of 
the Canal policy. 
This Court can and should review the relevant policy provisions and statutory 
provisions without the need to resort to Regal's claim of "ambiguity." 
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II. REGAL'S CLAIM IS SUBJECT TO 
MANDATORY ARBITRATION 
In Regal's Appellee Brief, Regal continues to argue and assert the fiction that 
Christina Chatwin, the injured pedestrian, has made a claim for PIP benefits against 
Canal and that Canal reftised to pay such PIP benefits to Christina Chatwin. Regal then 
claims, based upon this fictional argument, that Regal's so-called "subrogation" rights 
in attempting to enforce Christina Chatwin's rights, somehow negate the mandatory 
arbitration provisions of § 31A-22-310(6)(b). 
Regal makes much of the argument that if Canal's policy does provide PIP 
coverage, then the Canal policy would be "primary" and Regal's policy only 
"secondary." However, even a "primary" insurer cannot pay a claim that is never 
made. Canal wishes to emphasize the fact that at no time has Christina Chatwin ever 
made a claim against Canal or otherwise contacted Canal in connection with her PIP 
benefits nor has Christina Chatwin made any other claim at any time to this day against 
Canal Insurance Company. Regal, and not Chatwin, contacted Canal long after the 
accident and after it had already paid its PIP limits to its insured, Chatwin, and 
demanded that Canal reimburse Regal for PIP benefits paid to its insured. 
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Regal would now have this Court accept and believe the fiction that when Regal 
contacted Canal demanding reimbursement of PIP benefits paid to Chatwin, that under 
principles of subrogation, it was really Chatwin making the request and as such, 
Canal's denial of Regal's request for PIP reimbursement constitutes a direct denial by 
Canal of PIP benefits to Chatwin. Regal would further have the Court accept the 
pretension that since Canal did not reimburse Regal PIP benefits previously paid to 
Chatwin within 30 days of Regal's demand, that Canal must also pay interest and 
attorneys fees pursuant to the provisions of § 31A-22-310(5). 
Canal respectfully requests that this Court should not accept Regal's fiction 
under the guise of "subrogation" but look at the facts as they actually took place. 
Specifically, Chatwin at no time has made application for or a claim for PIP benefits to 
Canal. Instead, Chatwin made a claim for PIP benefits to Regal. Regal paid those 
benefits and subsequently sought reimbursement of PIP benefits from Canal. Canal 
declined to reimburse Regal for PIP benefits paid to Regal's insured, Chatwin, based 
on Canal's understanding of its policy provisions and further based upon Canal's 
reliance on Utah law, which requires that a request for reimbursement of PIP benefits 
from one insurance carrier to another is subject to mandatory arbitration. 
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Canal respectfully submits that there is no reason to pretend that Christina 
Chatwin, after sustaining an injury in the accident of November 11, 1995, made 
application to PIP benefits to Canal. She did not. There is no reason to pretend that 
Canal refused to pay Christina Chatwin PIP benefits within 30 days of her application 
and that Canal should therefore be liable for interest and attorneys fees. This did not 
happen. There is no reason to pretend that Regal's request for reimbursement of PIP 
benefits from Canal is really just a "coverage question" and therefore not a 
reimbursement claim subject to the mandatory arbitration provisions of § 31A-22-
310(6)(b). 
Should these fictions asserted by Regal be accepted by this Court, the provisions 
of § 31A-22-310(6)(b) would become virtually meaningless. Any insurance carrier 
having paid PIP benefits to its insured, which carrier did not want to go to the trouble 
of mandatory arbitration, could claim that it was merely exercising its "subrogation" 
rights and, as Regal did herein, file a direct suit against an adverse insurance carrier 
claiming that since it is exercising its "subrogation rights," it need not comply with the 
mandatory arbitration provisions under Utah law. 
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Regal paid $3,000.00 in PIP benefits to its insured, Christina Chatwin. 
Subsequently, Regal requested reimbursement of those PIP benefits from Canal 
Insurance Company, the insurer of the semi-trailer (apparently Regal has never 
demanded reimbursement of PIP benefits from the insurers or owners of the semi-
tractor involved in the accident). Regal may well be entitled to reimbursement of PIP 
benefits from either the insurers of the tractor or Canal, the insurers of the trailer. 
However, the appropriate forum to determine whether or not Regal is entitled to 
reimbursement of PIP benefits paid to its insured, is arbitration. 
Canal has never received an application for PIP benefits from Christina Chatwin. 
Chatwin has never contacted Canal and has never made a claim for PIP benefits or any 
other insurance benefits from Canal at any time. Canal has never denied PIP benefits 
to Chatwin and in fact has had no contact with Chatwin whatsoever. Chatwin was paid 
PIP benefits within 30 days of her application, by Regal. There is no legal or factual 
basis for the trial court's awarding prejudgment interest and attorneys fees to Regal, 
Chatwin's insurers, pursuant to the provisions of § 31A-22-310(5), which section was 
intended to protect insureds such as Chatwin making PIP claims against an insurance 
carrier from waiting an inordinate amount of time before those claims are processed 
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and payments are made. This section was never intended to be used as a basis for a 
windfall award of attorneys fees and prejudgment interest to one insurance carrier, in 
this case Regal, seeking reimbursement of PIP benefits from another insurance carrier, 
in this case Canal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in finding that the Canal policy of insurance provided PIP 
coverage on the KC Trucking semi-trailer under circumstances involved in the accident 
in question, specifically while the semi-trailer was borrowed by another entity and 
attached to and being pulled by a tractor not insured by Canal and presumably insured 
by another carrier. Canal's policy only intents that PIP coverage is provided to the 
extent required by Title 31 A, which statute does not require PIP coverage on semi-
trailers. 
Even if Canal's policy does provide PIP coverage, Christina Chatwin has never 
at any time made application for PIP benefits to Canal. Chatwin requested PIP benefits 
from her insurance carrier, Regal, Regal paid those benefits and subsequently requested 
reimbursement from Canal. If reimbursement by Canal or any other insurance carrier 
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is appropriate, then the proper forum to decide that issue is arbitration pursuant to § 
31A-22-310(6). 
Canal has never denied PIP benefits to Chatwin and the trial court erred in 
awarding to Regal attorneys fees and prejudgment interest pursuant to § 31A-22-310(5). 
Respectftdly submitted this day of December, 2001. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
AHLER 
r Appellant 
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